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Chapter 1 
 
Mobilising International Law as an Instrument of Global Justice: 
Introduction 
 
Jeff Handmaker and Karin Arts 
 
Globalisation and the Emergence of Global Justice 
 
Globalisation is a hotly debated topic. There is a plethora of literature on the subject. 
Much of the debate is oriented around the economic and social dimensions of 
globalisation, leading to a situation in which, despite massive increases in global capital 
and foreign direct investment, previously existing inequalities have been exacerbated.1 
According to this literature, inequalities at global and national levels have led, 
correspondingly, to low wages, poverty, pressures to migrate, human insecurity and 
ultimately global insecurity. 
  A prominent commentator on the topic, Saskia Sassen, has observed that the processes 
of globalisation cut across traditional institutions, including legal institutions. This, she 
has argued, ‘does not mean that the old hierarchies [have] disappear[ed], but rather that 
rescalings [have] emerg[ed] alongside the old ones’. 2  Economic globalisation in 
particular, she argued, has produced a process to ‘negotiate the intersection of national 
law and the activities of foreign economic actors’, a process that has been ‘shaped and 
driven by often thick and complex  
 
																																																								
1 Bernhard Gunter and Rolph van der Hoeven, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalisation: A Review of the 
Literature’ (2004) 143 International Labour Review, 7-43. And more recently: Alan Alexandroff and 
Andrew Cooper (eds.), Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010); Andrew Gamble, The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist 
Crisis and the Politics of Recession (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Gilford John Ikenberry, ‘The Future 
of Liberal World Order’ (2015) 16 Japanese Journal of Political Science, 450-455; Charles Kupchan, 
‘The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana’ (2014) 23 
Security Studies, 219-257; Sijbren de Jong, Rem Korteweg and Artur Usanov (eds.), New Players, New 
Game? The Impact of Emerging Economies on Global Governance (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2013); Thomas Weiss, Global Governance: What? Why? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); 
Des Gasper and Thanh Dam Truong (eds.), Transnational Migration and Human Security (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2011). 
2  Saskia Sassen, ‘Globalization or Denationalization?’ (2003) 12 Review of International Political 
Economy, 1-22 at 6. 
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agendas … and an elaborate body of law’.3 Furthermore, the content of this body of 
law, which has emerged over a relatively short period of just a few decades, has changed 
the traditionally ‘exclusive territorial authority’ of the nation state, ‘to an extent not 
seen in earlier centuries’.4 In practice, corporate protection has increased as a result of 
this legalisation5 and entrenched corporate legal personality. On the other hand, social 
protection has been reduced through legal measures that are produced through a liberal, 
democratic rule of law system, or what we refer to in this chapter as liberal lawmaking. 
For example, liberal lawmaking tends to prioritise property rights over social and 
economic rights, de-emphasises government regulation of the market, and is reluctant 
to interfere in matters that a judge determines to be primarily falling under another 
state’s jurisdiction. This system of liberal democracy and lawmaking has furthermore 
been reproduced in other countries, and is indeed perfectly functional in authoritarian 
regimes.6 Hence, civic actors across the globe have been left with few other avenues 
for social and economic redress than, often very confrontational, claims directed against 
both states and corporations. All in all, the developments sketched above have had a 
number of legal, social, and economic consequences that are the subject of critical 
attention in this book. 
  First, liberal lawmaking has led to what Koskenniemi has termed a ‘fragmentation’ of 
international law whereby lawyers must continually refine their understandings of the 
ever-changing nature and purpose of law. 7  This includes the ways in which 
international legal rules have been given expression at the domestic level. By extension, 
increased legalisation has spawned a plethora of what Koskenniemi in Chapter 2 of this 
book refers to as ‘legal vocabularies’. In particular, human rights, as a legal normative 
project, comprise one of the vocabularies in international law that are often at odds with 
some aspects of liberal legal regimes. As discussed by nearly all contributors to this 
book, these tensions are especially apparent when human rights are instrumentalised, 
either by state or civic actors, and acquire a more explicitly political character. A 
positive illustration of this is the way in which human rights vocabuly has been 
‘socialised’ or ‘translated’ into locally relevant contexts through mobilisation by civic 
																																																								3	Ibid.	7.	4	Ibid.	8.	5	Subhabrata	Banerjee,	‘Corporate	Social	Responsibility:	The	Good,	the	Bad	and	the	Ugly’,	Critical	
Sociology,	34	(2008),	51–79	at	54.	6	Ibid.	70.	7	Martti	Koskenniemi,	The	Politics	of	International	Law	(Oxford:	Hart,	2011).	
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actors.8 For example, as discussed in Chapter 10 by Oomen, municipal governments 
aware of social challenges—such as hate speech by right-wing political groups—are 
uniquely positioned to realise human rights protection in a culturally relevant manner, 
such as by preventing municipal funding to these groups. But international vocabularies 
also have the negative potential to obscure local cultural notions of justice and replace 
them with ‘Western’-oriented notions of justice. A good example of the latter is the 
way in which the much-lauded Gacaca courts in Rwanda, billed as ‘local’ or 
‘customary’ justice mechanisms, were essentially framed by Western donors and 
consultants.9 Furthermore, some legal vocabularies have at best been rather impotent, 
and at worst played a role in subordinating people in developing countries to conquest 
and domination. The latter has led to a fundamental questioning of international law 
and its liberal underpinnings by scholars associated with Third World Approaches to 
International Law, or ‘TWAIL’.10 
  The dysfunction of international law in addressing human rights concerns by way of 
concrete enforcement measures is one of the most challenging aspects of mobilising 
international law for global justice that the chapters in this book explore, at multiple 
levels of enforcement and in relation to different themes. Human rights treaties are often 
not self-executing. States may ratify human rights treaties as a symbolic gesture in order 
to avoid international criticism. Lax monitoring and weak enforcement mechanisms for 
non-compliance permit states to ‘get away with continued human rights violations’.11 
Moreover, while formal institutions at national and international levels have largely 
fallen short in operationalising human rights—including the pursuit of international  
  
																																																								8	Thomas	Risse,	Steve	Ropp,	and	Kathryn	Sikkink,	eds,	The	Power	of	Human	Rights:	International	Norms	and	Domestic	Change	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999);	Sally	Merry,	‘Translating	Human	Rights	and	Local	Activism:	Mapping	the	Middle’,	American	Anthropologist,	108	(2006),	38–51.	9	Barbara	Oomen,	‘Donor	Driven	Justice	and	its	Discontents:	The	Case	of	Rwanda’,	Development	
and	Change,	36	(2005),	887–910.	10	See	e.g.	Makau	Mutua,	‘What	is	Twail?’	American	Society	of	International	Law,	Proceedings	of	the	
94th	Annual	Meeting,	(2000),	31–9;	Antony	Anghie,	‘TWAIL:	Past	and	Future’,	International	
Community	Law	Review,	10	(2008),	470–81;	James	Gathii,	‘TWAIL:	A	Brief	History	of	its	Origins,	its	Decentralized	Network,	and	a	Tentative	Bibliography’,	Trade,	Law	and	Development,	3/1	(2011),	26–64;	M.	Sornarajah,	‘On	Fighting	Global	Justice:	The	Role	of	a	Third	World	International	Lawyer’,	Third	World	Quarterly	37/11	(2016),1972–89.	But	see	also	S.G.	Sreejith,	‘An	Auto-Critique	of	TWAIL’s	Historical	Fallacy:	Sketching	an	Alternative	Manifesto’,	Third	World	
Quarterly,	37/11	(2016),	1511–30.	11	Oomen	(2005),	927.	
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criminal justice, one of the specific themes explored in this book—the possibilities for 
creative responses by civic actors using the law to support broader forms of legal 
mobilisation have correspondingly increased. Examples include the capacity of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to interact with the International Criminal Court, 
either by bringing evidence of crimes to the attention of the prosecutor, by supporting 
individuals in witness protection programmes, or by offering legal and logistical 
support to victims who wish to participate in hearings. In that space, law is wielded in 
a strategic way to promote progressive structural change.12 
  Second, liberal lawmaking has created particular challenges for intergovernmental 
regulators seeking to end problematic practices taking place on a global scale, such as 
the financing of international terrorism13 or international child abduction. The latter 
receives detailed attention in this book in Chapter 5 by Maja Groff. International 
regulators seeking to end such practices have found themselves managing tensions 
between diverse national legal systems. They have also had to recognise the need for 
more proactive human rights approaches to guide the direction of global regulation and 
resist bureaucratic solutions to complex social problems that lie at the core of such 
problematic practices. Furthermore, the highly contested relationship between national 
and international legal orders is a key challenge in enforcing international law. While 
indeed this observation as such is not particularly new, these contestations have become 
especially visible in the efforts of national regulators to address other global issues, 
such as transboundary corruption. As discussed by Abiola Makinwa in Chapter 6 of 
this book, the enforcement of transboundary corruption has revealed not only the 
challenges of selective national enforcement of anti-corruption laws, but also a very 
patchy record of corporate self-regulation that has singularly failed to address the social 
and economic factors driving corruption. 
  Third, liberal lawmaking has generated a number of vague but rhetorically significant 
and globally enforceable doctrines and principles. Paralleling the retreat of the state to 
directly regulating individual or corporate misbehaviour, civic actors who have been 
forced to make claims themselves have instrumentalised these doctrines and principles 
at multiple jurisdictional levels. This has created possibilities for  
																																																								12	Jeff	Handmaker,	‘Peering	Through	the	Legal	Mobilisation	Lens	to	Analyse	the	Potential	of	Legal	Advocacy’,	presentation	in	Leiden	Socio-Legal	Series,	Leiden	University,	2017.	13	Nathanael	Ali,	‘Dynamism	and	the	Erosion	of	Procedural	Safeguards	in	International	Governance	of	Terrorism’,	PhD	thesis,	Erasmus	University,	Rotterdam,	2015.	
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individuals, for example, military commanders and even corporate managers, such as 
board members, to be held directly responsible for serious international crimes. Such 
crimes are prosecutable not only through international criminal courts, but also by 
national authorities, and even through civil claims on the basis of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. 14  In such instances, the focus of international law has 
dramatically shifted away from the state (although not entirely of course) and has more 
explicitly engaged individuals who had hitherto been regarded as passive ‘objects’ of 
international law. While civic participation in international (criminal) law has expanded, 
the retreat of the state has been matched by a general reluctance of, and a high degree 
of selectivity by, states in exercising jurisdiction over international crimes. 15 
Accordingly, this tendency towards cosmopolitanism or global constitutionalism has 
been at odds with the tendency of some, often quite powerful, states to pursue an 
exceptionalist agenda that negates these universal principles and is premised on a claim 
of hegemonic legitimacy by these states. For example, Richard Falk has criticised the 
United States of America for exercising forceful military intervention without sanction 
of the UN Security Council, arguing that this is in contravention of international law, 
and has led to double standards being applied.16 Similarly, Saba in Chapter 5 of this 
book explains how Israel’s extreme use of force against civilians, negating principles 
of protection enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, reveals its profound disregard for 
international legal rules. 
  Finally, as the line between international and national becomes increasingly difficult 
to distinguish, it is becoming clear that the consequences of liberal lawmaking are more 
acutely felt ‘at home’, including at the level of the city. The conventional functioning 
of multiple vocabularies in international law through national (state-level) institutions 
and international organisations have led to normative contestations, bureaucratic 
solutions, and inconsistent enforcement. By contrast, the forces of globalisation have 
had a more positive influence from a municipal standpoint, where in some cases there 
is greater respect for international law norms than at the national level. Challenging 
Koskenniemi’s  																																																								14	Jeff	Handmaker	and	Liesbeth	Zegveld,	‘Universal	Jurisdiction:	State	of	Affairs	and	Ways	Ahead.	A	Policy	Paper’,	Working	Paper	532	(2012),	International	Institute	of	Social	Studies,	Erasmus	University,	Rotterdam.	<https://repub.eur.nl/pub/31137>	15	Robert	Cryer	Prosecuting	International	Crimes:	Selectivity	and	the	International	Criminal	Law	Regime	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).	16	Richard	Falk,	‘Legality	and	Legitimacy:	the	Quest	for	Principled	Flexibility	and	Restraint’,	
Review	of	International	Studies,	31	(2005),	33–50.	
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observations that the power of human rights tends to be lost when they are 
instrumentalised by public authorities, Chapter 10 by Oomen reveals that, in contrast 
to national government authorities that tend to ‘rank’ rights in accordance with what is 
all too often a security agenda, human rights-based approaches are being incorporated 
directly into municipal policies and programmes, including the symbolic ratification of 
international human rights treaties that national governments may refuse to ratify. 
  The liberal lawmaking project has had a number of consequences for those engaged 
in mobilising international law for global justice. Fragmentation in international law 
has been matched by a proliferation of legal vocabularies. International regulators have 
struggled to counter specific practices (such as child abduction and foreign corruption) 
that cause great harm on a global scale. Vague but rhetorically significant and globally 
enforceable doctrines and principles, such as the Responsibility to Protect and 
obligations to prosecute international crimes, are rarely enforced by states. So what is 
the potential for mobilising global justice in a world of liberal states? How indeed can 
the concept be understood? 
  
The Elusive Concept of (Global) Justice 
 
Just as is the case with the term globalisation, notions of justice, and even more so 
global justice, have been elusive and difficult to define. Thomas Pogge and others have 
attempted to do so, emphasising a pro-poor orientation that promotes rights-based 
approaches and takes issue with the influence of multinational corporations and other 
powerful interests in international policymaking and governance.17 However, Pogge 
framed his definition of global justice in Rawlsian terms, falling short of fundamentally 
critiquing the liberal underpinnings of lawmaking that trigger the need for global justice, 
such as the liberal legal characterisation of corporations as legal persons. 
  Hence, Pogge’s notion of global justice is associated with liberal articulations of social 
justice, drawing broadly on the work of Rawls that stresses social and economic 
inequalities.18 Liberal endorsers of social justice often pay attention to promoting the 
interests of the poor through realising access  
																																																								17	Thomas	Pogge,	Global	Justice	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2001);	Florian	Wettstein,	Multinational	
Corporations	and	Global	Justice	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2009).	18	Ibid.	
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to justice and are inspired by iconic figures such as Nelson Mandela, who also endorsed 
a liberal vision of social justice.19 
The United Nations approach to social justice was recently rearticulated in the 
Sustainable Development Goals. They focus on the need to narrow yawning gaps in 
wealth between rich and poor countries and between citizens within countries; 
eliminate poverty; protect the environment; and ensure health, shelter, education, and 
non-violence for all.20 The Sustainable Development Goals uphold the liberal position 
that states are expected to live up to their human rights obligations. This formalistic 
position that is exclusively oriented around the rule of law fails to fully acknowledge 
the structural circumstances in which individuals are often forced to make claims 
against the state regarding their rights. This liberal premise is reinforced by Golub, 
Khan, Banik, and others who, during the mid- to late-2000s, emphasised the need for 
legal empowerment of those living in poverty. They grounded their social justice 
perspective in the everyday realities of the poor and recognised that there were multiple 
ways in which the poor could be supported through intermediary, legal, and other 
mechanisms.21 The legal empowerment concept has also become a basis for substantive 
rule of law interventions, for example by the International Development Law 
Organisation (IDLO).22 
Similarly, Pogge identified access to medicines coupled with measures to track 
outreach efforts and cost-effectiveness in health system delivery and challenging the 
interests of pharmaceutical companies as primary features of global health justice.23 
While Nagel critiqued Rawls’s notions of egalitarianism, and in particular his tolerance 
for non-liberal states, his  
																																																								19	Nelson	Mandela,	‘The	Continuing	Struggle	for	Social	Justice’,	in	International	Labour	Office,	Visions	of	the	Future	of	Social	Justice:	Essays	on	the	Occasion	of	the	ILO’s	75th	Anniversary	(Geneva:	ILO	Publications,	1994),	183–5.	20	Addressing	inequality,	so	as	to	‘leave	no	one	behind’,	is	a	central	notion	in	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	which	are	the	core	of	the	development	agenda	pursued	by	the	United	Nations	in	the	period	2016–2030.	See	UN	Doc.	A/RES/70/1,	21	October	2015.	See	also	Karin	Arts,	‘Inclusive	Sustainable	Development:	A	Human	Rights	Perspective’,	Current	Opinion	in	
Environmental	Sustainability,	24	(2017),58–62.	21	Stephen	Golub,	Beyond	Rule	of	Law	Orthodoxy:	The	Legal	Empowerment	Alternative	(Washington,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace,	2003);	Irene	Khan,	The	Unheard	Truth:	Poverty	and	Human	Rights	(New	York:	Norton,	2009);	Dan	Banik,	‘Legal	Empowerment	as	a	Conceptual	and	Operational	Tool	in	Poverty	Eradication’		Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law,	1	(2009),	117–31.	22	Stephen	Golub,	ed.,	Legal	Empowerment:	Practitioners	Perspectives	(Rome:	IDLO,	2010).	23	Thomas	Pogge,	‘The	Health	Impact	Fund:	Enhancing	Justice	and	Efficiency	in	Global	Health’,	
Journal	of	Human	Development	and	Capabilities,	13	(2012),	537–59.	
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position was still fundamentally a liberal one. Underlining the challenges of defining 
global justice from a human rights or humanitarian perspective, a principal emphasis of 
this book, Thomas Nagel has argued that: ‘The normative force of the most basic human 
rights against violence, enslavement, and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian 
duties of rescue from immediate danger, depends only on our capacity to put ourselves 
in other people’s shoes.’24 But does either of these conceptualisations of global justice 
go far enough? Even if notions of global justice place an emphasis on either the social 
or socio-economic characteristics of justice, failing to critique the shortcomings of 
liberal lawmaking and institutions may be an oversight. 
  By contrast, Adrian Bedner’s reconceptualisation of what is meant by the rule of law 
concept has highlighted the function of the rule of law, rather than its normative content. 
He has emphasised that the rule of law concept is highly contested, particularly in 
pluralistic legal systems.25 More specifically, he has questioned the capacity of liberal 
lawmaking and institutions to address state power: 
 
one may establish legal rules and procedures to be followed to call the state to 
order on this matter, but if such behaviour is widespread even the most ‘liberal’ 
procedures applied by the most independent of judiciaries cannot control it. In 
the end it is the behaviour of state bodies themselves which is decisive. In most, 
if not all rule of law conceptions this is a major litmus test to establish whether 
a state can be labelled as obeying the rule of law.26 
 
To drive home this point, Bedner has further reflected on the practice of rule of law 
interventions, observing that ‘those developing rule of law indicators may lose sight of 
the legal issues and only focus on state practices’.27 He has also stressed the importance 
of relating what one knows about the legal system to explaining people’s experience 
with ‘formal legality’.28 In making the case for a socio-legal approach to studying the 
rule of law, which takes into account legal practice as well as normative legal questions, 
Bedner joins other socio-legal scholars who have made a strong   
																																																								24	Thomas	Nagel,	‘The	Problem	of	Global	Justice’,	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs,	33	(2005),	113–47	at	131.	25	Adrian	Bedner,	‘An	Elementary	Approach	to	the	Rule	of	Law’,	Hague	Journal	on	the	Rule	of	Law,	2	(2010),	48–74.	26	Ibid.	59.	27	Ibid.	60.	28	Ibid.	62.	
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case for addressing the function of law, rather than simply its normative content. 
  By a similar token, driven by the practices of international transitional and criminal 
justice mechanisms, scholarly literature relating to global justice has increasingly 
focused on criminal justice, and primarily on ending impunity. Particular attention has 
been devoted to the role of the International Criminal Court and other criminal justice 
mechanisms. 29  This institutional form of global justice has primarily involved 
punishing individuals for particular human rights violations qualified as international 
crimes (such as torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). Attempts to apply 
this have extended to former world leaders such as Augusto Pinochet from Chile, 
Hissène Habré from Chad, and Charles Taylor from Liberia. These developments have 
furthermore been underpinned by the post-World War Two utopian ideal ‘never again’, 
which refers to the response of world powers to some of the horrors of war by 
establishing the UN; codifying human rights; and creating international criminal 
tribunals to prosecute individual violators for example in Nuremberg, Tokyo, and later 
in The Hague and Arusha, as well as hybrid-international criminal tribunals in Freetown 
and Phnom Penh. 
  While doctrinal accounts of international criminal justice mechanisms, and a still 
liberal orientation concerning rule of law questions have tended to dominate the 
scholarly debate on global justice, broader questions have also come up, which question 
the function of law as an instrument of global justice. Such questions have explored, 
among other issues, the politics of state (non-)compliance with international human 
rights and the strategic challenges involved in accomplishing global justice.30 Nouwen 
and Werner have critiqued the institutionalisation of formal criminal justice 
mechanisms, particularly when labelled as global justice interventions, to monopolise 
justice discourses. They argue that this preference for global solutions has resulted in 
the sidelining of what  
																																																								29	Frédéric	Mégret	‘What	Sort	of	Global	Justice	is	International	Criminal	Justice?’	International	
Journal	of	Criminal	Justice	,	13	(2015),	77–96;	Geoffrey	Robertson,	Crimes	Against	Humanity:	The	Struggle	for	Global	Justice	(New	York:	New	Press,	2006);	Luis	Moreno	Ocampo,	‘The	International	Criminal	Court:	Seeking	Global	Justice’,	Case	Western	Reserve	Journal	of	
International	Law,	40	(2009),	216–26;	Marlies	Glasius,	‘What	is	Global	Justice	and	Who	Decides?	Civil	Society	and	Victim	Responses	to	the	International	Criminal	Court’s	First	Investigations’	Human	Rights	Quarterly,	31,	(2009),	496–520.	30	David	Barnhizer,	Effective	Strategies	for	Protecting	Human	Rights	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2001);	Christopher	Lamont,	International	Criminal	Justice	and	the	Politics	of	Non-Compliance	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2010).	
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they term ‘alternative’ conceptualisations of justice, thereby transcending ‘the values, 
institutions and interests of directly affected communities’.31 Accordingly, we now turn 
to the function of law as an instrument for pursuing global justice. 
  
The Function of Law as an Instrument for Pursuing Global Justice 
 
Similar to conceptualisations of justice, the function of law as an instrument for global 
justice has an ambiguous character. Law and legal institutions articulate bold promises, 
yet contain very definite limits to what they can deliver, let alone explain in relation to 
complex social phenomena.  
  Legal perspectives have a very different starting point than other scholarly 
perspectives, particularly within the social sciences. While there are numerous 
perspectives among legal scholars about the content of law, its origins, interpretations 
and the institutions created to enforce it, legal scholarship has generally resisted multi- 
or inter-disciplinary study. Many lawyers and legal scholars continue to regard law 
either as a given product (lex lata – law as it is) or as something of the future (lex 
ferenda – law as it should be). Positivist or doctrinal legal scholars continue to make 
claims to objectivity.32  
  Legal scholars such as Rosalyn Higgins have departed from a purely doctrinal 
understanding of law, and in particular of international law, recognising the value of 
seeing law as process. For instance, Higgins has characterised the primary function of 
international law as a ‘co-ordination of clashing wills’, or alternatively, to reflect certain 
realities and aspirations of peoples in relation to what they hoped international law 
might achieve, for example in realising self-determination.33 Higgins’ characterisation 
of law as process recognises the pluralistic nature of international law, beyond its 
normative content. Such an approach allows for a critique of international law’s 
function, by interacting with other disciplines such as sociology, politics and 
anthropology. Such approaches furthermore recognise the complexity of participants 
involved in legal process and their interactions 
with liberal law-making processes, with legal institutions and indeed with each other. 																																																								31	Sarah	Nouwen	and	Wouter	Werner,	‘Monopolizing	Global	Justice:	International	Criminal	Law	as	Challenge	to	Human	Diversity’,	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice,	13	(2015),	157–76	at	158.	
32 Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Objectivity in Law’ (2010) 5 Philosophy Compass, 240–249. 
33 Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 11-
12. 
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  On the other side of the scholarly plain, social scientists often misunderstand law. Law 
has been regarded as irrelevant, particularly by scholars studying culture in relation to 
identity, race, lifestyle, ritual and other factors, conceptualising law and culture as 
‘distinct realms of action and only marginally related to one another’. 34 Countering this 
perspective, Mezey has argued: ‘Law, at first glance, appears easier to grasp if 
considered in opposition to culture as the articulated rules and rights set forth in 
constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, the formality of dispute resolution, and the 
foundation of social order. In most conceptions of culture, law is occasionally a 
component, but it is most often peripheral or irrelevant. 35  Such an assumption, 
according to Mezey, is ‘profoundly wrong’ indeed, just as wrong as legal scholars 
dismissing the cultural implications of law.36  
  Indeed, law is a cultural system in itself. As Cotterell deftly put it: ‘legal ideas are a 
means of structuring the social world’.37 Society structures law, and law structures 
relationships within society. Law is also highly political, whether in the manner in 
which it is made, the circumstances and ways in which it is understood and interpreted, 
or the extent to which it is respected (or not). Social justice advocates invoke law in 
order to underpin claims for self-determination or to try and hold states or corporations 
accountable by way of campaigns and sometimes audacious acts of civil disobedience. 
Examples include: a Greenpeace action to interrupt a Formula One racing event by 
drawing attention to its primary sponsor, a multinational oil corporation implicated in 
violations of environmental law, including damage to the environment in the Arctic;38 
large-scale demonstrations at meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos from 
2005 until 2015 to emphasise alleged failures of the Forum’s organisers to adequately 
address human rights violations by corporations, particularly in the extractive industries 
(although as of 2016 the protests were largely abandoned following a “lifetime 
achievement  
																																																								
34 Naomi Mezey, ‘Law as Culture’ (2001) 13 Yale Law Journal, 35-67 at 35. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. See also e.g. Lan Cao, Culture in Law and Development: Nurturing Positive Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016) and Kate Nash, The Cultural Politics of Human Rights: Comparing the 
US and the UK (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
37 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and 
Society, 171-192 at 192. 
38 Greenpeace, ‘Shell’s priceless Grand Prix Moment’, (2013), available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/en/news/climate/Shells-priceless-Grand-Prix-moment/ . 
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award” to Chevron Corporation);39 and, as explained in Chapter 4, repeated efforts by 
civil society activists to ‘break the blockade’ in Gaza by sailing boats to the Israeli-
occupied territory.40  
  Law also functions as the framework for administering international organisations in 
order to prevent a proliferation of conflicts, or to intervene by way of forceful measures 
in order to try and resolve a conflict, though it often fails to do so and is argued to be 
hopelessly outdated in this regard. 41  The work done in and by international 
organisations is embedded within high-level negotiations that are featured by massive 
power differentials (for example in the United Nations Security Council). Law should 
also function to regulate the behaviour of states, of individuals and of corporations, but 
is often limited by nationalist and hegemonic acts of protectionism, reinforced by 
complex webs of interests involving powerful governments and politicians, and above 
all the market. 
  International development interventions too have an explicit legal basis, whether in 
functioning to eradicate poverty and improving the quality of healthcare in developing 
countries, or introducing preferential trade measures in order to enable developing 
countries to participate in international markets on a more equitable basis. As 
elaborated earlier in this introduction, both international and national law are also a 
basis for efforts to end impunity for international crimes. 
  In these, and so many other respects, law fulfils a central function in society, in 
political discourse and in social relations. But its resistance to other scholarly 
perspectives, and the way in which some legal scholars fail to critically address the 
normative, liberal bias embedded in law has served as an impediment to understanding 
the complex interactions between politics and law, not to mention its structural potential 
as a vehicle for delivering global justice. 
 
The Structural Bias in International Law: What Have We Learned? 
Koskenniemi has argued that there is a ‘structural bias’ embedded within global 
governance institutions, itself a consequence of the fragmentation  
																																																								
39 Samuel Oakford, ‘This Year in Davos, Opponents Aren’t Even Bothering to Protest’, ViceNews (2016).  
40 This particular example is discussed in chapter 4 of this book by Claudia Saba. 41	Christine	Chinkin	and	Mary	Kaldor,	International	Law	and	New	Wars	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017).	
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of international law. 42  According to this concept, international law is not the 
homogenous system it once was but has evolved into ‘a wide variety of specialist 
vocabularies and institutions’.43 As discussed earlier, these include the international 
legal vocabularies of human rights and criminal law. However, according to 
Koskenniemi, the rhetoric of rights has lost its ‘transformative effect’ through over-
legalistic explanations and is ‘not as powerful as it claims to be’.44 
  Related to the structural bias, Koskenniemi has also raised concerns about the extent 
to which international legal institutions are characterised by an excessive 
managerialism, ‘that envisages law beyond the state as an instrument for particular 
values, interests, preferences’.45  While acknowledging that it is highly difficult to 
manage anything on a global scale, Koskenniemi has argued that the ‘unforeseeability 
of future events, including the effect that any determining rules might have in practice 
suggests that such rules ought not to be laid out at the outset’.46 
  Similar to Higgins, who stressed the processual nature of law, Koskenniemi’s 
declaration of the malleability of law has represented a serious shift away from the 
preoccupation of legal scholars with what has been regarded as legal doctrinal 
argumentation. Regarding law as inherently political thus represented a fundamental 
challenge to widely held assumptions within legal scholarship about the nature of law 
and also helped to explain why legal instruments and administrative institutions have 
so inadequately served as a vehicle for delivering social justice. 
  Koskenniemi’s reflections on the structural bias contained in international law and the 
dangers of managerialism build on nearly three decades of critical scholarship. This 
first gained wide attention through his seminal article on the politics of international 
law in 1990 in the first issue of the European Journal of International Law.47 Directed 
primarily to international lawyers, both scholars and practitioners, he argued that one 
should look beyond the normative liberal tendency that underpins the world view of 
many lawyers, that is, to look beyond the content of law. On the one hand, Koskenniemi 
argued that international law has been  																																																								42	Martti	Koskenniemi	‘The	politics	of	international	law:	20	years	later’,	European	Journal	of	International	Law,	20/1	(2009),	7–19	at	9.	43	Ibid.	12.	44	Koskenniemi	(2011),	133.	45	Martti	Koskenniemi	‘Constitutionalism,	Managerialism	and	the	Ethos	of	Legal	Education’,	
European	Journal	of	Legal	Studies,	1	(2007),	1–18	at	2.	46	Ibid.	8.	47	Martti	Koskenniemi,	‘The	Politics	of	International	Law’,	European	Journal	of	International	Law,	1	(1990),	4–32.	
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criticised as ‘too apologetic to be taken seriously’ because of its dependence on the 
political power, and thus the power politics, of states.48 On the other hand, international 
law has been considered to be too far removed from power politics and thus ‘too utopian’ 
(or speculative) to meet the challenges of a complex globalised world.49 Rather than 
forming an objective system of ‘concrete and normative’ and therefore ‘valid’ and 
‘binding’ rules, as many lawyers claim them to be, Koskenniemi observed that 
international legal rules were, in fact, highly malleable. Thus, he asserted that: 
 
it is impossible to prove that a rule, principle or doctrine (in short, an argument) 
is both concrete and normative simultaneously. The two requirements cancel 
each other out. An argument about concreteness is an argument about the 
closeness of a particular rule, principle or doctrine to state practice. But the 
closer to state practice an argument is, the less normative and the more political 
it seems. … An argument about normativity, on the other hand, is an argument 
which intends to demonstrate the rule’s distance from state will and practice. 
The more normative a rule, the more political [the rule] seems because the less 
it is possible to argue [the rule] by reference to social context. It seems utopian 
and – like theories of natural justice – manipulable at will.50 
 
So what has been the response to Koskenniemi’s critique in the intervening years, if 
any? The picture is mixed. While conventional legal scholars maintain a largely 
doctrinal discussion, debating ‘simply’ the content of international law, other legal 
scholars have ventured into the social, cultural, political, and economic underpinnings 
of international law and governance institutions. 51  For example, Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal has studied the role of transnational and so-called third world social 
movements both in resisting and using international law ‘from below’ and in seeking 
to redefine its content in the course of social justice struggles, at both national and 
global levels.52 John Hagan, Sarah Nouwen, Wouter Werner, and others have critically 
studied the  
																																																								48	Ibid.	9.	49	Ibid.	50	Ibid.	8	(emphasis	in	original	text).	51	Edwin	Egede	and	Peter	Sutch,	The	Politics	of	International	Law	and	International	Justice	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2013);	Mezey	(2001),	;	Dana	Gold,	ed.,	Law	and	
Economics:	Towards	Social	Justice	(Bingley:	JAI	Press,	2009).	52	Balakrishnan	Rajagopal,	International	Law	From	Below:	Development,	Social	Movements	and	Third	World	Resistance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003).	See	also	Jeff	Handmaker,	Advocating	for	Accountability:	Civic-State	Interactions	to	Protect	Refugees	in	South	Africa	(Antwerpen,	Intersentia,	2009).	
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administration of international criminal justice.53 Makau Mutua has made a political 
and cultural critique of the human rights corpus, the NGOs and institutions involved in 
the articulation of social problems, and the construction of justice mechanisms intended 
to address those problems.54 Doris Buss has studied how international criminal law and 
its enforcement institutions draw on various forms of expert knowledge (sociology, 
anthropology, history, and other disciplines) in the course of delivering criminal 
justice.55 
  Similarly, Barbara Oomen has been studying the disconnect between national and 
global justice. Taking on the human rights corpus, which others such as Mutua have 
criticised, Oomen has sought to explain why there is a lack of national enforcement of 
international human rights norms by analysing the example of the Dutch government 
‘exporting’ human rights norms and values while it simultaneously ignored critical 
human rights issues at home.56 
  From a growing critical literature on the politics of international law, and the justice 
mechanisms that accompany these normative frameworks, new discussions have 
emerged. This has been especially evident in the vocabulary of human rights, including 
Barnhizer and colleagues’ extensive evaluation of human rights as an important 
‘strategic system’ in global governance.57 While most studies focus on the nature of 
legal concepts, and several of these concepts feature in the contributions to this book as 
well—for example in relation to the Responsibility to Protect,58  
																																																								53	John	Hagan,	Justice	in	the	Balkans:	Prosecuting	War	Crimes	in	the	Hague	Tribunal	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2003);	Sarah	Nouwen,	Complementarity	in	the	Line	of	Fire	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013);	Sarah	Nouwen	and	Wouter	Werner,	‘Doing	Justice	to	the	Political:	The	International	Criminal	Court	in	Uganda	and	Sudan’,	European	Journal	
of	International	Law,	21	(2010),	941–65.	54	Makau	Mutua,	‘Savages,	Victims	and	Saviors:	The	Metaphor	of	Human	Rights’,	Harvard	Human	
Rights	Journal,	42	(2001),	201–45.	55	Doris	Buss,	‘Expert	Witnesses	and	International	War	Crimes	Trials:	Making	Sense	of	Large-Scale	Violence	in	Rwanda’,	in	Dubravka	Zarkov	and	Marlies	Glasius,	eds,	Narratives	of	Justice	in	and	Out	of	the	Courtroom	(Heidelberg:	Springer,	2014).	56	Barbara	Oomen,	Rights	for	Others:	The	Slow	Home-Coming	of	Human	Rights	in	the	Netherlands	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013).	See	also	Karin	Arts,	‘Reflections	on	Human	Rights	in	the	Netherlands’,	Netherlands	Quarterly	of	Human	Rights,	33/4	(2015),	374–81	and	Jasper	Krommendijk’s	chapter	in	this	book.	57	Barnhizer	(2001).	58	Anne	Orford,	International	Authority	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011);	Karin	Wester,	‘Promise	and	Pitfalls	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	Lessons	to	be	Learned	from	the	Case	of	Libya’,	PhD	thesis,	University	of	Amsterdam,	2016.	
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obligations erga omnes,59 and universal jurisdiction60—some address the challenges of 
enforcement.61 
  This book as a whole shows in various ways how the invoking of legal vocabularies 
have framed the possibilities for mobilising international law for global justice. In 
addition to showing how this legal mobilisation can potentially hold states, corporations, 
or individuals accountable for violations of international law, numerous inconsistencies 
within the global liberal legal order are revealed. 
 
Structure of the Book and Chapter Summaries 
 
The potential for realising justice through invoking the law by way of different kinds 
of engagements is the core theme of this book. Accordingly, this book is organised in 
three parts that each address the realisation of justice from a different vantage point. 
The first part of the book explores how realising justice requires a conscious and critical 
engagement with the nature and role of international law and the multiple ‘vocabularies’ 
that international law produces. The second part of the book explores three empirical 
examples of how instrumentalising specific legal vocabularies to realise justice can 
solve political problems in some cases, and in other cases creates new problems 
altogether. The third and last part of the book explores the particular challenges of 
realising justice by embedding international legal principles in a national or local setting. 
  The first part of the book presents three critical perspectives on the nature and role of 
international law and justice in addressing social problems. The chapter by Martti 
Koskenniemi, which substantially sets the tone of the book and to which all authors 
make reference, addresses what he refers to as the ‘competing vocabularies’ of 
international justice, international politics, and international law and their relationship 
with each other, highlighting justice as the most important and difficult to define of the 
three. Koskenniemi draws on the theories of Morgenthau and Lauterpacht to illustrate 
the tensions between these competing vocabularies. He argues that both scholars had 
valid perspectives on how to realise justice. Koskenniemi then proceeds to highlight 
how  
																																																								59	Jochen	A.	Frohwein,	‘Obligations	Erga	Omnes’,	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law	(Oxford	University	Press,	2015).	60	Cedric	Ryngaert,	Jurisdiction	in	International	Law	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2008).	61	Christian	Tams,	Enforcing	Obligations	Erga	Omnes	in	International	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).	
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lawyers and political observers view these concepts differently through the use of these 
different frames. He observes that ‘there is no “correct” response to the question who 
is right—the jurist or the politician’62 and often it is a matter of looking through frames 
simultaneously, while also explicitly recognising the differences and the implications 
of each other’s positions. He concludes Chapter 2 by revisiting his often-stated critique 
on the fragmentation of international law, emphasising the importance of legal learning 
on the failure of international law to resolve social problems, which he characterises as 
the ‘politics of re-description’. He further observes that lawyers need to engage with 
this rather than avoid it (which lawyers are inclined to do). 
  Chapter 3 by Warner Ten Kate and Sarah Nouwen develops this theme in the specific 
context of international criminal justice. The authors provide explanations for why the 
views of some individuals and groups are re-described or amplified in the discourse on 
international criminal justice while others are silenced. This, they argue ‘is not the 
inevitable consequence of a technical development’,63 but is the culmination of what 
Koskenniemi in this book refers to as ‘the politics of re-description’.64 
  Nouwen and Ten Kate argue that the spaces for civic participation, according to the 
‘language’ of international law, are very limited, especially with regard to the 
prosecution of international crimes. Nouwen and Ten Kate then discuss in more detail 
the participation of various stakeholders in transitional justice processes. In an earlier 
work, Nouwen and Werner had argued that, in the course of legal and political 
processes, punishment tends to be much more emphasised than reconciliation and other 
forms of justice.65 
  Chapter 4 by Claudia Saba complements Nouwen and Ten Kate’s analysis by 
revealing efforts on the part of civil society organisations to provide a justice solution 
when states and international authorities fail to do so. In particular, she focuses on the 
role of the so-called ‘Freedom Flotilla’, which sought to provide concrete humanitarian 
assistance, notably medical supplies, to Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territory of 
Gaza and generate international attention for their situation. Saba’s chapter vividly 
reveals the strategic importance of engaging with the political character of law, towards 
the realisation of justice.  
																																																								62	Chapter	2,	27.	63	Chapter	3,		46.	64	Chapter	2,	40-44.		65	Nouwen	and	Werner	(2015).	
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Accordingly, she addresses issues concerning: legal versus political discourse and 
efforts to make them ‘talk’ to each other; the mobilisation of international law, 
including deliberately misinterpreting it for one’s own purposes; the powerlessness of 
law against the existing political order; and bringing Palestinian voices to the fore by 
mobilising international law arguments. In so doing, Saba illustrates how civil society 
organisations can contribute to attempts to re-describe international law and, by 
explicitly engaging in the political and legal implications of their actions, promote 
justice. 
  The second part of the book, on new vocabularies in international law, addresses 
various dimensions of how law has emerged to solve political problems, or in some 
cases has made matters worse. As the authors in this section reveal, the plethora of legal 
vocabularies has given rise to new challenges in the functioning of international legal 
norms relating to, respectively: harmonising public and private international law, as 
illustrated by the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law; 
combating foreign-based corruption; implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’; and 
addressing the challenges of universal jurisdiction for international crimes. 
  Maja Groff, in Chapter 5, seeks to counter some prominent critiques of international 
law (including Koskenniemi’s ideas about an over-reliance on formalistic rules and lack 
of appropriate interdisciplinary engagement; excessive ‘managerialism’ in international 
institutions; the indeterminacy of international legal norms; and Eurocentrism), 
choosing rather to focus on potential avenues of further progress in international law. 
She does so on the basis of the work done by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, especially as regards child support, abduction, and protection orders. 
The relationship between private and public international law principles plays a 
significant role in her chapter. 
  Next, in Chapter 6, Abiola Makinwa discusses global efforts to end impunity for 
foreign-based corruption. She critically explores the formidable challenges faced by 
both lawyers and politicians in seeking to introduce concrete measures. She evaluates 
the global regime to address international corruption, including ‘smart’ measures and 
the complementary measures taken by states to address international corruption, 
including the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act. She also 
shares some observations concerning the fragmentation of international law, building 
on Koskenniemi’s characterisation of conceptual ‘boxes’, each of which comes with its 
own vocabulary. Abiola argues that, due to the lack of a coherent set of rules and 
regulations governing international efforts 
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to tackle foreign-based corruption, ‘multiple boxes are emerging’. The resulting 
fragmentation leads to different standards of compliance among countries that ought to 
be harmonising their efforts in order to tackle the extraterritorial nature of international 
corruption practices. Accordingly, she notes various general lessons that can be drawn 
from this global effort at norm-making to address international corruption, also based 
on her larger study of this area.66 
  In Chapter 7, Mark Kersten introduces the concept of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) and in particular addresses the relationship between the RtoP concept and the 
role of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Using the lenses of liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism, he argues that, although both the RtoP and the ICC have emerged 
from liberal cosmopolitan values, the role of the UN Security Council in determining 
their scope and function has eroded these values. 
  Kersten makes particular reference to Libya, drawing on numerous empirical 
examples that illustrate the extensive range of unilateral, regional (NATO), and 
multilateral efforts to try and resolve the crisis in that country. Accordingly, he 
highlights various military, humanitarian, and other justifications for intervening in 
Libya’s affairs, measuring these interventions against the principles underpinning the 
RtoP. This allows him to make certain observations about the utility of both the concept 
of the RtoP and the functioning of the ICC, based on Koskenniemi’s characterisation 
of international law serving as a form of political apology or utopian ideal. 
  The third section of the book refers to localised efforts to realise justice through 
‘bringing human rights home’ by introducing national and even municipal measures to 
implement international human rights obligations. These last four chapters address the 
practical normative and functional challenges of realising global values at the national 
and local levels while confronting diverse socio-cultural and political contexts. From 
the national prosecution of international crimes and the associated recognition of 
humanitarian law to the realisation of children’s rights and establishment of ‘human 
rights cities’, the authors in this section explore the hard issues of domesticating, and 
even translating, human rights in a locally relevant manner.67 
 
																																																								66	Abiola	Makinwa,	Private	Remedies	for	Corruption:	Towards	an	International	Framework	(The	Hague:	Eleven	International,	2013).	67	Merry	(2006).		
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  Aisling O’Sullivan in Chapter 8 discusses the many tensions of the national exercise 
of universal jurisdiction for international crimes, which lay bare the exceptional 
challenges of addressing the pluralistic and often politicised character of international 
criminal law that were alluded to by Nouwen and Ten Kate in Chapter 2. O’Sullivan’s 
chapter explores various positions concerning the universal jurisdiction debate, and in 
particular the politically sensitive question of whether it is legally possible to prosecute 
someone for international crimes through a national court without the physical presence 
(i.e. in absentia) of the accused on the territory involved. The implications of deciding 
whether or not to prosecute in turn relate to more complicated matters as to whether 
prosecutions in these circumstances are desirable and raise multiple and competing 
questions of realising justice: for the accused, for the victims of international crimes, 
and/or for ‘humanity’ in general. In weighing these different and often competing 
considerations, O’Sullivan engages with a classic debate—which she acknowledges as 
irreconcilable—on whether law ought first and foremost to meet the justice needs of 
the so-called international community or of individuals. 
  This is followed by Jasper Krommendijk’s chapter (Chapter 9), which provides insight 
into the extent to which states have been influenced by the Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child when introducing national measures aimed at 
the realisation of children’s rights. Evaluating the extent to which the Netherlands has 
given effect to its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child by 
domesticating these international human rights norms, and drawing on international law 
and international relations theory, Krommendijk reveals whether the Committee has 
exerted a ‘compliance pull’ or has affected the extent to which states act on the findings 
of the Committee by giving concrete effect to them in their policies and legislation. 
  Finally, in Chapter 10, Barbara Oomen analyses efforts to go beyond pure formal 
domestication of international legal norms and more deeply embed or translate global 
human rights obligations at a local level through the establishment of so-called human 
rights cities. Realising human rights at the municipal level, Oomen argues, holds 
tremendous potential for fostering a culture of constitutionalism. Accordingly, she 
questions whether the tensions between the various ‘global’ vocabularies referred to by 
Koskenniemi present fundamental problems when crafting human rights policies, 
particularly at the local level where municipal government responses often are more 
grounded in the local realities of  
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rights violation and realisation. Oomen suggests that Koskenniemi’s distinction 
between talking either ‘Rabbit’ or ‘Duckalese’, respectively the language of politics or 
that of the law, might not be that simple in local practice. 
The book concludes with final reflections (Chapter 11) on the various chapters that re-
engage with Koskenniemi’s politics of re-description and how three key dilemmas 
faced by those mobilising the law in order to realise justice are revealed, namely: the 
cultural embeddedness of justice understandings, the non-enforcement of international 
legal obligations, and the existence of significant socio-economic gaps at the global 
level. 
 
